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Down in the Dumps: Can States
Regulate Out-of-State Waste Flow and
Survive the Commerce Clause?
"It is unfair for any city... to not have the right to say no
to the garbage coming into their state."1 Senator Baucus
I. INTRODUCTION: SHOULD STATES BE ABLE TO LIMIT THE
FLOW OF FOREIGN PRODUCED WASTE?
Throughout the United States, trains and trucks are creeping
slowly over our national railways and highways bearing cargo that nobody
really wants but which many are willing to accept. Increasingly, cashstrapped communities are making what have been characterized as pacts
with the devil by opening up their lands to rivers of waste flowing in from
other states.' Such deals often sacrifice long-term health and environmental
concerns for immediate financial gain" However, such immediate gains are
often illusory; the money and jobs usually disappear long before the
garbage does.' Unfortunately, those who recognize the dubious benefits of
such deals increasingly find themselves at a disadvantage in the fight to
prevent such deals from being made. Time and again state and local
initiatives that attempt to limit the deluge of out-of-state waste have been
voided by courts as violating of the dormant power of the Commerce
Clause.' Furthermore, although Congress has the power to authorize states
to regulate the flow of out-of-state waste,6 efforts to pass such a bill have
thus far been unsuccessful. Although the issue, the debate, and the
argument, have been around for years, intensified waste-output and
diminishing landfill resources makes the resolution of the waste crisis
increasingly more crucial.

1. Congressional debate surrounding a proposal to allow states to regulate against outof-state waste. 142 CONG. Rsc. S10649-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17,1996) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
2. See Richard Woodbury, Get on Board the Sludge Train, TIME, Sept. 14,1992, at 54.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See generally City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (5-2 decision)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, CJ.); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of
Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (5-2 decision) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
6. The power of Congress to regulate commerce being plenary, it may authorize states
to do that which, without such authorization, would violate the negative implications of the
Commerce Clause. See, WILLIAM B. LOCKHART et. al., CONsrnmONAL LAW,
CASES-COMMEN'IS--QUESIONS 228 (7th ed. 1991).
7. Recently, a bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act in favor of local governments
to curtail importation of foreign waste had failed to make it out of committee. See H.R. 2323,
104th Cong. (1996).
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To more fully appreciate the circumstances surrounding this issue,
consider the following. New York City alone places approximately 10,000
tons of municipal waste daily into the garbage stream.8 Furthermore, in
1992,200 million tons of municipal waste were produced within the United
States,9 ten percent of which was exported to be landfilled outside its state
of origin.' In essence, 18 million tons of waste were flowing unhindered
and oftentimes unwelcome by many into cities, counties, and states that
could do little to ward them off. What is even more troubling is that often
the recipients of such waste have made considerable efforts to reduce the
amount of waste they produce from becoming landfilled. For instance,
Oregon has a comprehensive plan for managing waste which includes the
enforcement of a bottle redemption plan,11 funding the operation of
recycling facilities,12 and other methods of reducing or reusing waste.
However, the Supreme Court recently voided as unconstitutional an
Oregon statute that would have helped prevent other states from exploiting
the advances it has made in reducing landfilled waste.'
Based on the lack of judicial and federal legislative support, one
might assume that states cannot stop out-of-state garbage from being
dumped in their backyards. 1' A brief review of the judicial history
concerning this issue illustrates the problems a state may face should it
enact legislation which affects the ability of an out-of-state interest to
dispose of waste within the state.
II. THE DORMANT POWER OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
WASTE MANAGEMENT
In 1973, New Jersey, fearing that it would soon run out of landfill
space, enacted a law that provided that "[no person shall bring into [the]
state any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside
the state." 5 New Jersey argued that the law was a valid exercise of its
police power since a reduction in the importation of out-of-state produced
waste would aid in reducing the total amount of land dedicated to

8. See CONG. REC., supranote 1.
9. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-720 at 25-26 (1994), reprintedin 1994 US.C.C.A.N. 3342.
10. See id.
11. See OR. REv. STAT. § 459A.735 (1995).
12. See OR. REv. STAT. § 459.015 (1995).
13. See Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 US. 93
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
14. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-720, supra note 9.
15. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 US. 617,618 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting,
quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West 1978) (repealed 1981)).
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landfilling waste.16 Such a reduction would necessarily aid in protecting the
health and welfare of its citizenry from the hazardous effects of excessive
landfill siting."7 The Supreme Court, however, overruled the statute as a
violation of the dormant power of the Commerce Clause.'
Under the dormant power of the Commerce Clause, states may not
act to economically discriminate against other states. 9 In City of
Philadelphia,the Court recognized the validity of New Jersey's interest in
reducing the dangers attendant to overexploitation of landflls. 20 However,
the Court found that the regulation operated in a manner that
discriminated against out-of-state interests and was thus facially invalid
under the dormant power of the Commerce Clause,' the regulation acted
in a way that unfairly interfered with interstate commerce, an area in which
only Congress has the ability to regulate.' The Court reasoned that, since
New Jersey made no effort to distinguish foreign produced waste from
waste produced inside the state other than by the mere foreign nature of
the out-of-state waste, New Jersey was attempting to commercially isolate
itself and its resources.' Explaining the need to guard against state
commercial isolationism, the Court concluded that "[tloday, cities in
Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or necessary to send their
waste into New Jersey.... Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may find it

expedient or necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New York.
... ,' The Court may feel justified in having made this statement since, as
of 1993, New Jersey ranks among the leading exporters of municipal waste

while Pennsylvania ranks as one of the leading importers.' However, it is
easy to classify the Court's decision as causal rather than prophetic since,
had it been able to better manage its landfills by protecting them from
foreign waste in 1978, New Jersey might not have needed to send its waste
to Philadelphia in 1993.
Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the position it took in City
of Philadelphia,when it struck down an Oregon statute that charged a
higher per-ton dumping fee for landfilling out-of-state waste than it did for

16. See id. at 625.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 627.
20. See id. at 625.
21. See id. at 627.
22. See id.
23. See City of Philadelphia,437 US. at 625.
24. Id. at 629.
25. In 1993, half of all exported municipal waste originated in New York, New Jersey,
Missouri, and Washington, while half of all imported municipal waste went to Pennsylvania,
Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Waste War: Oregon Waste SysteM,
Inc. v. Departmentof Environmental Quality,23 B.C. ENVFL AFF. L Rsv. 43,44 (1995).
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disposal of waste generated within the state.' In defense of its statute,

Oregon argued that the surcharge was simply a compensatory tax that
spread the cost of its waste management programs equally among in-state
and out-of-state users of its landfills. ' The State's theory was that in-state
interests already paid for the waste management programs through local
and state taxes; because foreign interests benefited from the programs, the
surcharge was equitable in that it spread the cost of the programs to out-ofstate interests which would otherwise go untaxed.' Again, the Supreme
Court found the statute constitutionally invalid.'
As it had in City of Philadelphia,the Court relied upon the dormant
power of the Commerce Clause and its provisions against state
isolationism and economic discrimination.3 Essentially ignoring Oregon's
compensatory tax argument, the Court stated, "because respondents have
offered no legitimate reason to subject waste generated in other states to a
discriminatory surcharge... the surcharge is facially invalid."3'
Recognizing the ramifications of the Court's decision, Justice Rhenquist
stated in dissent that the Supreme Court's use of the dormant Commerce
Clause "ties the hands of the states in addressing the vexing national
problem of solid waste disposaL" In his dissent, Justice Rhenquist argued
that the Court's holding effectively turned the Commerce Clause "on its
head" since, by allowing out-of-state interests to benefit from Oregon's
efforts to reduce landfilled waste, such out-of-state interests gain an unfair
advantage.3 To this end, Rhenquist would uphold the Constitutionality of
a "compensatory tax" that would force out-of-state interests to "pay their
fair share for the use of Oregon landfill sites."'
The Court's interpretation of the dormant power of the Commerce
Clause has helped create a "shortage of available landfill space" by
removing accountability from waste-exporting states for the waste they
produce. In addition, it disallows waste-importing states the ability to
protect themselves from the "Noah's flood of garbage imports."' However,
although it can be argued that the Court erred in applying the dormant

26. See Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
27. See id. at 94.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 108.
32. Id. at 109.
33. Id. at 112.
34. Id. at 116.
35. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-720, supra note 9.
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power of the Commerce Clause to municipal waste issues,-* it is not
necessary for the Court to overturn twenty years of precedent before states
may legitimately reduce the flow of waste into their landfills. Indeed,
considering that space committed to landfills has fallen dramatically in
Maine,' and that landfill space in Oregon was made available by
innovative recycling and reuse measures, ' it is somewhat fatalistic to view
the Commerce Clause as-totally preventing states from making progress in
this area. However, it seems intrinsically unfair that states such as Oregon
and Maine, which have expended time and money to reduce the landfilling
of their own waste, should have the benefits of such efforts eroded by their
seeming inability to protect those advances from exploitation by others.
This article addresses the problem of interstate waste exportation
and the apparent inability of states to protect themselves from it in a
manner that does not run afoul of the Commerce Clause. States that
implement aggressive waste reduction and management programs should
not only be applauded, they can and should, implement constitutionally
valid legislation protecting the benefits of such programs from unfair
exploitation by other states. Since the Supreme Court has recognized
conservation of natural resources (including landfill conservation) and
easing of solid waste disposal as valid state interests," and since the Court
has recognized that state legislation that affects commerce may survive a
Commerce Clause challenge when the legislation is applied
evenhandedly," states can pass legislation that protects its citizenry from
the hazardous effects attendant to out-of-state exploitation of landfill space
if such regulation does not discriminate unfairly.
III. BOTTLE BILLS, RECYCLING PROGRAMS AND OTHER
MEANS OF LIMITING THE LANDFILLING OF WASTE
Some states produce waste that differs from waste produced in
other states. As an example of the difference, imagine two one-ton piles of
36. That is to say, the Court simply should not have regarded waste and landfilling as
"commerce," thus removing the Issue from the purview of the dormant power of the
Commerce Clause. This position has been espoused by Justice Rehnquist. See Oregon Waste
Systems, 511 US. at 109.
37. In the early 1980s, there were 450 dumping areas and landfills in Maine, by 1992, the
number had decreased to 250. Landfills Dwindle in Maine While Recycling Flourishes, SouD
WASTE REPORT (June 27,1996) availablein 1996 WL 8244533 [hereinafter Landfills Dwindle).
38. Oregon has recently passed legislation which prioritizes the disposal of solid waste;

disposal by landfilling is the last option after reuse, recycling, composting and energy
recovery. Op. REv. STAT. § 459A.735 (1995).
39. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part; Stevens, J.dissenting).

40. See id. at 471.
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pre-processed municipal waste. Suppose that "Pile A" originated in a state
that does not subject its waste to extensive reduction and reuse programs.
Next, suppose that "Pile B" originated in a state that employs a progressive
waste management program. Before either pile is subjected to its state's
respective waste management program, they will be nearly identical.
However, now suppose that the two piles of waste are subjected to their
respective states waste-processing programs. After processing, Pile B will
contain markedly smaller amounts of certain types of waste than will Pile
A as well as simply containing less waste over all. That difference can be
used as a basis for distinguishing waste produced in a state that employs
an aggressive waste-reduction program from waste produced in a state
that does not. By using the processing of waste as a basis of regulation,
states can avoid the bane that has caused so much regulation in this area
to fail. That is, a state need not rely on the "mere foreign nature"41 of waste
when it passes legislation making it more difficult for other states to dump
their waste.
Since there is a basis to distinguish one state's waste from another
that is not discriminatory on its face, it is possible for a state that effectively
employs waste reduction programs to survive a Commerce Clause
challenge when it regulates to reduce the overall amount of waste
landfilled. Here, a state may regulate even if such a regulatory scheme may
adversely affect the ability of out-of-state interest to export waste.
In 1971, Oregon passed the first enduring beverage container
redemption bill calling for a minimum refund of five cents to the
purchaser of certain beverage containers upon their return to a redemption
cite.' Currently, there are nine other states that have adopted similar
legislation." The efficacy of these programs is astounding, and although
most states do support some form of recycling program, they do not yield
nearly the same results. For instance, in Oregon it is estimated that 93
percent of all glass bottles that are redeemable for deposit are returned to
redemption centers, thus avoiding the landfill. In contrast, it is also
estimated that only 28 percent of all non-deposit bottles within the state are

41. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 US. 617 (1978). Regulation simply against
"foreign waste" is not constitutionally permissible.
42. Vermont passed the first statewide bottle bill in 1953. However, it was repealed
within four years after having met with only moderate success. WiLuAM K. SHmRMAN ST AL,
CALIFORNIA PuBuc INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP & STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY,

THE CALPIRG-EI.S STUDY GROUP RE~ovr ON CAN AND BOTME BiLis 53 (1981).
43. See OR. REV. STAT. § 459A.735 (1995).
44. Those states are Indiana, Vermont, Michigan, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Iowa, California, Indiana, and Maine.
45. See OREGON BorTE BILL CAMPAIGN, VOTE YEs ON 3711 (1996).
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recycled." Moreover, in Massachusetts return rates of deposit containers
average 85 percent, while other non-refundable containers are recycled at
a rate of only 32 percent." Nationally, it is estimated that in states without
redemption laws, plastic beverage container recycling rates are around 30
percent and glass beverage container recycling rates are as low as 16
percent.' It is estimated that the quarter of the nation's population that
lives in bottle bill states recycles 1.5 million tons of beverage containers,
while only 1.3 million tons are recycled by the entire remaining 75 percent
of the population. 9 Furthermore, with initiatives to expand bottle bill
legislation in three states, it is likely that certain states will landfill even less
plastic, glass, and aluminum beverage containers than they currently do.s'
Based on the percentages discussed above, it can be estimated that the
average ton of municipal waste from a bottle bill state would contain nearly
70 percent less of certain beverage containers than would an average ton
of municipal waste from a state that did not employ bottle redemption
programs. Since an average ton of municipal waste is comprised of nearly
four percent of the types of containers redeemed under bottle bill
programs, a state such as Oregon will reduce the average ton of landflled
municipal waste by at least 75 pounds, whereas an average state that does
not employ a redemption plan will reduce a ton of waste by only 24
pounds."' Although a difference of 51 pounds per ton may not seem
significant on its face, when one considers that New York creates 10,000
tons of municipal waste daily," such differences add up. Therefore,
considering that beverage containers account for much of the waste
produced annually, a state that effectively eliminates most of such
containers from the waste stream has made significant headway in
reducing the total amount of waste it landfills, thereby extending the useful
life of its landfills.
Furthermore, in many states bottle redemption programs are only
one part of a larger program to reduce landfilled waste. In these states the

46. See id.
47. See Letter from Jodi Segal, Staff Member of MassPIRG to Jason Rael (Oct. 10, 1996) (on
file with author).
48. See id.
49. See id.

50. Ongoing initiatives in California, Massachusetts, and Oregon would augment those
state's bottle bill legislation by raising redemption rates (thus encouraging even more returns)
and expanding their bills to cover a wider variety of containers. Industries Battle Over
California'sInitiative to Raise Bottle Deposits, SOUD WASTE REPORT (Jan. 25, 1996) availablein
1996 WL 8264266.
51. The formula used to reach these figures relied upon percentages of beverage

container waste reduction being calculated at 93%for bottle bill states and 30% for non bottle
bill states. See OREGON BorTLE BILL CAMPAIGN, supra note 45; Segal, supra note 47.
52. See CONG. REC., supranote 1.
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correlation between active waste management programs and the overall
waste a state landfills is even more apparent. For example, nationally,
municipal waste is landfilled at a rate of 76 percent " Out of every 100 tons
of municipal waste created, 76 tons are landfilled while only 24 tons are
otherwise reused s' However, in states like Massachusetts and Connecticut
waste is landfilled at a rate of only 24 percent and 20 percent, respectively.'
Similarly, Maine currently landfills around 40 percent of its municipal
waste.? Through new initiatives created to expand the types of redeemable
containers and by having placed redemption values on car batteries and
pesticide cans, the total percentage of municipal waste landfilled will be
expected to continue to decrease.'
The above figures provide a statistical basis upon which states can
draft a statute to protect themselves from the landfilling of out-of-state
waste. Since in many states waste is subjected to methods of reduction that
have a tremendous impact on the amount of waste landfilled, and since
other states fail to subject their waste to similar methods of reduction, the
difference between aggressively processed waste and other waste is
apparent. That difference (the reduction in overall waste landfilled) can be
drawn on to legislate against the dumping of out-of-state waste.
IV. SURVIVING A COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE
A state regulation is not necessarily void simply because it affects
interstate commerce. As a general rule, "[w]here a statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on commerce is dearly excessive in relation to the [state
interest]."' However, when a statute does not regulate in an even-handed
manner, Le., when the statute gives unfair preferences to in-state interests,
it will always fail to survive a Commerce Clause challenge unless the
regulation serves a legitimate state interest that could not adequately be
served by nondiscriminatory measures." Thus, when drafting or

53. See STATES EN PRoFIL: THE STATE PoucY REFERENCE Boor,Table 0-12 Municipal
Solid Waste Recycled, Incinerated and Landfilled (1991).
54. Seid.
55.

See id.

56. Maine produces around 1.5 million tons of waste annually while recycling 65,000 tons
of cans, glass, and plastic bottles. See Landfills Dwindle, supra note 37.
57. See id.
58. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 387 U.S. 137,142'(1970) (Stevens, J.dissenting).
59. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 US. 131 (1986). In Maine, the importation of live bait-fish into
the state was banned since importation increased the likelihood of spreading a parasite
harmful to fish. Id. at 132. Since there was no way of determining which fish bait-fish had the
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evaluating state sponsored legislation, the threshold question is whether
the regulatory power of the state is working to unfairly discriminate
against the interests of out-of-state parties.
A. The Discriminatory Prong of a Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge
Historically, in the area of regulating against waste importation,
the Supreme Court's test appears to have erected an impasse of Himalayan
proportion. States that have attempted to hinder the movement of foreign
waste across their borders have seen their efforts consistently fail. The
failure is the result of states' inability to properly show that waste
produced in-state was in distinguishable, in a manner that is not pretextual,
from waste produced out-of-state. States simply raised discriminatory
barriers on the landfilling of out-of-state waste.
States cannot be faulted for their failed attempts. The reason states
did not take steps to distinguish their waste was that, until recently, there
simply was no significant difference between waste produced within the
various states. However, that is no longer the case. Currently, wastereduction programs create a means of distinguishing waste. Therefore, the
Court's initial hurdle may now be overcome.
In many instances, where a state has taken aggressive action to
reduce the landflling of its own waste, e.g., by having passed redemption,
recycling, and other laws, and such actions have resulted in an appreciable
decrease in the ratio of waste produced to waste landfllled, such a state has
grounds upon which to distinguish its waste from waste produced in states
that make minimal or no effort to curb the landfilling of their waste. A
statute that works to discriminate against the dumping of waste on the
basis of how thoroughly it has been processed, and not on the mere
origination of the waste, would not operate to discriminate unfairly against
out-of-state interests and would most likely survive a Commerce Clause
challenge.
To better understand this point, consider the following model
statute, and what results when it is subjected to a Commerce Clause
analysis. The model statute, written for State X, reads:'
State X has long recognized that excessive landfilling of
waste presents a hazard to the health and welfare of our
citizenry, as well as being harmful to the natural

parasite, the general ban was upheld by the Court. 1d. at 151.
60. Of course, the model statute provided herein is not complete; the complete statute
would include a "definitions" section, a "penalties" section, a more detailed "enforcement"
section, etc. Such sections were intentionally excluded for clarity. Any excluded provisions
are not necessary for analyzing the statute under the Commerce Clause.
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environment In an attempt to minimize that hazard, we have
continuously supported programs that reduce the amount of
waste landfilled within our state. Such efforts have included
implementation of a bottle redemption program, curbside
recycling, and an energy reclamation program. Such efforts
reduction in the amount of waste
have resulted in significant
to the amount of waste produced. In an
landfllled in relation
effort to protect and further these advances, we hereby
require that all waste landfilled within the state must be
subjected to waste-management programs that produce
similar reductions in waste.

Proof that waste has undergone acceptable levels of
reduction must be obtained through our waste management
division. Such proof will be in the form of a permit; such

permit to be presented at the landfill site.

If the waste to be landfilled is produced out-of-state, proof of
waste reduction may be obtained from our waste

management division or the division of waste management
from the home-state of the out-of-state waste handier.

The waste management division may delegate the authority
to permit to any certified commercial waste processors.
process of reduction is any process
or recycled so as not to be
waste is re-used
wherebyAcceptable
landfilled. Such methods of processing may include, but are
not limited to, bottle redemption programs, curbside
recycling programs, and energy reclamation programs. 1

An acceptable level of reduction is a seventy-five pound per
ton reduction in landfilled waste.
A dumping fee of N dollars will be charged for any
waste which is not processed.
A dumping fee of M dollars will be charged for any
waste which is processed but which does not meet acceptable
levels of waste reduction.'

61. Energy reclamation involves the incineration of waste to produce electricty.
62. Provisions 7 and 8 will allow the dumping of waste which cannot effectively be
processed. For example, concrete generally cannot effectively be recycled or reused. Here,
states will implement dumping charges based on a sliding scale. States must charge an
increased amount for dumping waste that is not, or cannot, be recycled or reused. This would
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Our waste management division will ensure
compliance with these provisions.
A comparison of the above statute with regulations that have failed
and those that have survived Commerce Clause challenges will reveal that
State X's statute would not impermissibly discriminate against interstate
commerce.
In Oregon Waste Systems, the Supreme Court noted that when
Oregon levied a surcharge on the dumping of out-of-state waste and failed
to levy the same surcharge on waste produced within the state, its actions
constituted an unjustifiable act of discrimination against interstate
commerce." The Court stated that Oregon had offered no valid reason why
waste produced outside the state warranted a higher disposal fee than did
waste produced within the state.' Essentially, the statute mandated that
out-of-state interests pay a higher fee simply because they were out-of-state
interests."
Similarly, in C&A Carbone,Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,'7 the Supreme
Court found a municipal ordinance requiring that waste dumped within
the town's landfills first be processed at a designated local recycling facility
was discriminatory since "it allows only the favored operator to process
[the] waste."' In Carbone, the town of Clarkstown was financing the
purchase of a waste recycling plant by granting the plant's operators a
monopoly on all the waste processed within the town and by requiring that
any waste dumped within the town first be processed at the plant." The
Court found that the purpose behind the statutory favoring of the local
waste processor was financial in nature, and therefore, was not a valid use
of the town's regulatory power.7 Because the waste had to be processed at
a designated facility, whether or not it had already been processed
the
elsewhere, the Court stated that the regulation economically benefited
n
competition
all
against
discriminating
unfairly
while
operator
local
The proposed model statute would avoid the pitfalls experienced
by the regulatory schemes in the two cases mentioned above. First, unlike
allow for the dumping of unprocessed waste, or waste which has not been adequately
recycled or reused, while ensuring that it is unprofitable to simply avoid the waste-reduction
process altogether.
63. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
64. See id. at 99.
65. See id. at96.
66. See id.
67. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
68. Id. at 390.
69. Id. at 386.
70. Id. at 389.
71. Id.
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Oregon Waste Systems, all waste would be subjected to the same treatment
regardless of its origin. Since the statute contains specific reduction goals
(75 pounds per ton), if in-state interests failed to meet those goals, they too
will be prohibited from dumping their waste within the state. Second,
unlike C&A Carbone, no inherent economic gain is realized through the
statute. Indeed, considering the costs of oversight and administration, the
state and other parties within the state that are interested in landfilling
waste would actually be burdened economically. Out-of-state interests
would be similarly impeded, but since in-state and out-of-state interests
would be equally burdened, the statute would not work to discriminate
economically against out-of-state interest.
Moreover, although regulatory provisions created in the
hypothetical statute resemble the processing scheme voided in Carbone, it
is distinguishable in such a manner that it would not fail on the same
grounds. Similar to the ordinance in Carbone, the proposed statute requires
that all waste be inspected or processed, with an exception for those wastehandlers who wish to avoid the reduction process by paying a higher
dumping fee. However, in Carbone, Clarkstown's municipal ordinance,
while achieving the tangential benefit of reducing the amount of waste
landfilled within the town, was found to be essentially economic in
nature. The ordinance granted an economic monopoly to the local
processor, thereby disadvantaging and unfairly discriminating against outof-state economic interests n That is, the granting of the monopoly denied
out-of-state interests the opportunity to process their waste in a more
economically efficient manner.74 Because the Commerce Clause prohibits
economic barriers to trade, the ordinance was deemed
states from creating
5
unconstitutional
In contrast, State X's statute no economic benefit on State X. Local
waste processors may benefit economically if the statute were enacted since
out-of-state exporters of waste may choose to process their waste within
State X. However, foreign interests are not required to process their waste
through local waste processors. Out-of-state waste handlers may choose to
process the waste themselves, or they may choose to use foreign wasteprocessors to reduce their waste.
In fact the statute might actually work to deny State X economic
benefit since it is possible that many out-of-state interests would seek to
landfill their waste elsewhere rather than go through the expense ol
processing it. Thus, the statute could possibly work to reduce the overaU

72. Id. at 393.
73. C &A Carbone,511 U.S. at393.
74. Id.
75. d. at 391; see also LOCiHAr, supranote 6.
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money made by landfilling such waste. Moreover, any economic benefit
that State X might derive from the enactment of the waste reduction statute
would be incidental to the legislation and not its fundamental aim. Quite
simply, the statute works to limit waste landfilled, providing a substantial
benefit to the health and welfare of its citizenry. Regulations that affect
such goals are a legitimate use of the state's regulatory powers.
Furthermore, State X's statute resembles legislation that has
survived Commerce Clause challenges. In Minnesota v. Clover LeafCreamery
Co.,76 the Supreme Court upheld a regulation that prohibited the sale of
milk in plastic jugs holding that the regulation did not violate the
Commerce Clause.' In Clover Leaf, the Court noted that the statute worked
evenhandedly to prohibit all sales of milk in plastic containers "without
regard to whether the milk, the containers, or the sellers are from outside
[or inside] the State."7 Since, the regulation affected the sale of plastic milk
containers regardless of state origin, it was found to be non-discriminatory
on its face and thus per se illegal." Furthermore, the Court held that the
regulation worked in a nondiscriminatory manner even though the
majority of manufacturers of plastic milk containers operated outside the
state and many manufacturers of pulp-wood used to make paper milk
cartons, the use of which would be greatly enhanced by the statute, were
found within Minnesota.' ° Thus, although the prohibition on the sale of
plastic milk jugs did affect interstate commerce in a manner that could have
economically benefited Minnesota, it did not do so in a discriminatory
manner since the regulation focused on the harm caused by the milk
containers and not on their origin."1
State X's statute would operate in much the same manner since it
would not regulate waste based on state origin. Rather, it would subject all
waste slated to be landfilled to the same standards of waste reduction
regardless of where the waste originated. It is true that out-of-state waste
handlers may have difficulty dumping in State X if they choose not to
subject their waste to waste-reduction processes. In addition, it is true that
such foreign waste would be obligated to then pay the higher dumping fee.
However, this is not impermissible discrimination. Rather, the burdens
placed on out-of-state landfillers resemble the burdens placed on out-ofstate producers of plastic milk containers in Clover Leaf. In each instance,
the statute hinders the ability of out-of-state to conduct economic activity

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

449 U.S. 456 (1980).
See id.
Id.at 471.
Seeid.
See id. at 473.
See id. at 472.
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within the state. Yet, in each instance, in-state interests have been hindered
to the same degree.
The hypothetical statute seeks to regulate the harm inherent in
excessive landfilling of waste, and not on the origin of such waste. Out-ofstate interests that subject their waste to acceptable processes and meet
with acceptable levels of waste reduction will be able to landfill their waste
with the same ease as in-state interests that similarly comply with the
statute. Additionally, in-state interests which fail to meet acceptable
methods and levels of reduction will penalized to the same degree as outof-state interests.
By enacting legislation which looks at the manner in which waste
is treated, rather than looking at its origin, the hypothetical statute would
not be impermissibly discriminatory in nature. Since the statute is not
impermissibly discriminatory, it would survive the threshold question
under a Commerce Clause challenge.
One opposed to the statute might argue that the processing of
waste is not an acceptable means by which to regulate waste since waste
subjected to processing will contain essentially the same types of materials
as would waste not subject to processing. Thus, the unprocessed waste
itself would be in no way more harmful to the health and welfare of State
X's residents than waste that was not subjected to processing.
To some degree, the contention is true. Processed waste and
unprocessed waste is comprised of virtually the same types of material and
is be dissimilar only in the amount of certain materials comprising each (Le.
glass and plastic bottles, aluminum cans). However, such an argument
does not undermine the Constitutional foundations of the statute. State X
is not claiming that it is the type of materials being landfilled that present
a danger. Rather, it is the amount of waste landfilled that produces the
harm. The regulatory reductions required by the statute would positively
affect the overall amount of waste material being landfilled.
It is difficult to disagree with the contention that excessive waste
creates environmental and health problems. More waste means more land
being sited for landfills. More waste means a higher difficulty of managing
those landfills. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already held that a
regulations which seek to limit the amount of waste being dedicated to
landfills are within the state's power.'

82. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 US. 456 (1981). Though more
properly an equal protection argument (i.e. the regulatory classification is not rationally
related to the statutory purpose) the argument does have some bearing on a Commerce
Clause challenge in that, if the regulatory classification does not serve a valid state interest
then the benefits of such a regulation will be only incidental. Such incidental benefits would
thus not be enough to outweigh any interference with interstate commerce.
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In Clover Leaf, Minnesota successfully argued that plastic milk
containers created a waste management problem.' The Minnesota
Legislature did not claim that plastic milk jugs were inherently more
dangerous to landfill than were pulp-wood containers.8 ' Instead, the
legislature relied upon the finding that such containers were sufficiently
more bulky than were pulp-wood containers and that such bulk created a
problem of disposal causing more space to be dedicated to landfilling
waste." Because the Minnesota legislation was a legitimate use of its police
powers, and since such a basis of regulation did not discriminate unjustly
against out-of-state interests, the statute survived the threshold question
of a Commerce Clause Challenge.
State X's statute resembles the Clover Leaf statute in important
ways. By subjecting waste to a process of reduction before allowing such
waste to be landfilled, State X reduces the total amount of the waste
landfilled within the state. The active waste management programs will
significantly decrease the amount of waste that is dedicated to landfills in
State X. Moreover, by allowing only waste subjected to such processes to
be landfilled, State X would reduce the overall amount of waste dedicated
to dumping. Finally, such a regulation falls within the power of the state
since states have the power and the right to reduce the amount of waste
that goes into their landfills.
B. The Burden/Benefit Prong of a Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge
Even though State X's statute does not impermissibly discriminate
against out-of-state interests, it still must pass the "burden on interstate
commerce" test in order to survive a constitutional challenge." In order to
pass this test, "the incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce [by
a statute may not be] dearly excessive in relation to... local benefits.""'
Obviously, by charging higher dumping fees for some waste, by regulating
what can and cannot be dumped, by mandating that waste be processed
before landfilling, and by necessitating that permits be obtained before
dumping, State X's regulation would effect interstate commerce. However,
such effects are incidental and are not "dearly excessive" in relation to the
benefits which would be witnessed by such a regulation.

83. See id.
84. Legislative findings did not support an argument that plastic itself is more
environmentally unfriendly than pulp-wood. See id. at 465.
85. See id.

86. See Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 387 US. 137,142 (1970) (Stevens, J.dissenting).
87. Id. at 142.
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In Clover Leaf, the Minnesota statute regulated against the sale of
plastic milk jugs so as to promote resource conservation.' The legislature
found that plastic milk jugs were difficult to dispose of and took up an
unnecessary amount of space in landfill sites.' The respondents contested
the legislative findings and argued that use of plastic milk containers
instead of pulp-wood containers in fact conserved resources since less
energy was required to produce plastic containers."° Respondents also
argued that pulp-wood containers actually took up more space in landfills
than did plastic containers." However, the Court refrained from deciding
whether the alleged benefits of the regulation were well founded stating,
"it is not the function of the courts to substitute their evaluation of
legislative facts for that of the legislature." The Court indicated that it will
generally defer to legislative findings when such findings are not employed
in a discriminatory manner."
Having accepted the legislative findings as to what would be the
likely benefits of the regulation, the Court then balanced the purported
benefits against possible burdens on interstate commerce.' The Court
determined that the burden imposed on interstate commerce was not
"dearly excessive" in relation to the benefits incurred." The Court noted
that even with the regulation in place, milk products would continue
moving freely across the Minnesota border and that, since most dairies
package milk in containers other than ones made of plastic, the
inconvenience of having to conform with the different packaging
requirements in Minnesota would be minimal.%5 The Court concluded that
"there is no reason to suspect that the gainers will be Minnesota [pulpfarms] or the losers out-of-state [interests]."'
Any burden/benefit analysis must consider the circumstances
peculiar to the state enacting the legislation. That is to say, the analysis may
weigh differently when applied to a statute enacted by Virginia in
comparison to the same statute being enacted by Rhode Island. Since State
X is but a hypothetical entity, it is difficult to determine what burden State
X's statute would have on interstate commerce. Similarly, it is difficult to

See Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 458.
See id. at 458.
See id. at 460.
See id.
Id. at 470.
See Clover Leaf,449 U.S. at 470.
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%. See id.
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determine what the benefits would be." However, if actual statistics for
waste reduction programs are considered, it is possible to better anticipate
what the benefits and burdens would be. If, for instance, a state such as
Maine adopted State X's model statute, the probable benefits would be
more substantial than if as state such as New Mexico (which does little to
limit the amount of waste it landfills) were to pass the same statute. Since
the types of beverage containers that are redeemable in Maine comprise
upwards of 1.2 percent of the total waste produced within Maine," and
since upwards of 93 percent of such bottles are redeemed,"re it could be
expected that the total decrease in imported waste landfilled would be
around 24 pounds per ton (the same reduction that is witnessed for waste
produced within the state). And that is just the reduction stemming from
the processing out of beverage containers. This is not an insignificant figure
considering Maine alone redeemed some 65,000 tons of cans and bottles in
an one year period. 0 1
The benefits resulting from implementation of State X's statute
would be even more impressive if adopted by a state such as North
Carolina which landfills only 24 percent of its total waste.'m Should North
Carolina enact the statute, it would likely witness a significant decline in
out-of-state waste being dumped in its borders. By applying actual figures,
it becomes more apparent that the more effective the waste reduction
programs of any particular state, the more benefits that state will realize
should it enact the model statute.
However, as the benefits rise so to do the burdens. A state that
recycles and reuses a higher percentage of the waste it creates would
require equally aggressive waste reduction by out-of-state interests should
it enact the model statute. Thus, the implementation of the statute by such
a state would impinge on interstate commerce in the same proportion.
Yet the burden on interstate commerce would not be dearly
excessive in relation to the benefits to the state. States that already have
comprehensive programs of waste reduction would be impacted by the
statute only minimally if at alL Moreover, out-of-state interests that do not
currently process their waste to acceptable standards would not be
completely barred from accessing State X's landfills. Rather, they would
need to subject the waste they intend to dump within State X to waste

98. If State X had a very successful waste reduction program, necessitating that others
conform to their standards before landfilling within the state would incur more benefits. Of
course, the opposite is also true.
. 99. Recycling: Maine's Bottle Law Costs Too Much, Grocery Industry-FundedStudy Says, SOLID
WASTE REPORT (May 4,1995) availablein 1995 WL 8152260.
100. Landfills Dwinde, supranote 37.
101. Id.
102.

STATES INPROFILE, supra note 53.
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reduction programs or pay the higher dumping fee. Thus, such interests
would be only minimally affected by the statute since it could process their
waste themselves and dump the remainder within State X.
The statute, by only minimally affecting the ability of out-of-state
interests to dump waste within State X, only minimally burdens interstate
commerce. Such a minimal burden could not thus be seen as being clearly
excessive to the benefits accrued by enacting such a statute. Therefore, the
statute would withstand the burden/benefit test inherent in a Commerce
Clause challenge.
Since State X's statute would not work to discriminate unfairly
against out-of-state interests, and since the burden that such a statute
would place on interstate commerce would not be "dearly excessive" to the
benefits to the state, the statute would survive a Commerce Clause
challenge.
V. CONCLUSION: DISCRIMINATION VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY
Imagine that states began adopting statutes like the one drafted for
State X and that such statutes survived Commerce Clause challenges.
Would such regulations lead to the "interstate rivalries and parochial
protection of local economic interests" that the framers of the Constitution
were seeking to overcome?1" Would they lead to the hoarding of natural
resources that the Court warns against?1 Or, rather, would they simply
lead to states be held accountable for the waste they produce by allowing
states which engage in active waste-reduction to fully benefit from their
efforts?
A statute that attempts to spread responsibility to all who take
advantage of active waste-reduction programs does not offend the
Constitution. Such a statute would not result in unfair economic
isolationism. Rather, it allows equal access to resources based on a State's
willingness to preserve them. Furthermore, the statute allows states the
opportunity to protect their efforts to slow the flow of waste into their
landfills. It does so by permitting them the to reap the full benefits of such
efforts by disallowing states that are less concerned with conservation the
ability to exploit their gains. In addition, the statute does so in a way that
only minimally impacts the free flow of economic activity between states.
This type of legislation does not create discrimination, it promotes
responsibility.

103. See Charles T. DuMars, Market Power and Environmental Protection:A State's Right to
Exclude Garbagein InterstateCommerce, 21 N.M. L. RLV. 37,41 (1990).
104. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 US. 131 (1986).
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The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate commerce
"among the several states."' It does not, however, prohibit states from
advancing programs of conservation and environmental protection. Nor
should it. Understandably, certain states will feel the burden of any statute
which imposes restrictions on their ability to dump their waste. However,
since such regulations do not attempt to create economic barriers, it is not
the type of burden against which the Commerce Clause guards. Indeed, it
is intuitively unfair that a state like New Mexico, which produces millions
of tons of municipal waste and landfills 90 percent of all waste produced,"°
should be allowed the same access to Oregon's landfills as the people of
Oregon when they expend time and money attempting to limit waste
flowing into their landfills. The hypothetical statute proposed above would
likely survive a Commerce Clause challenge and would help states reap the
full environmental and health benefits of comprehensive waste

management programs. The statute would prohibit out-of-state interests
from unfairly infringing upon these benefits by dumping waste that is not
subject to the same processes. Moreover, such a statute would aid in
sbving the national crisis arising from over-exploitation of landfills by

limiting the ability of many states to simply export their problems. The
statute would help force states to deal with their own waste. Moreover, it

would do so in a manner that does not promote economic isolationism. It
is unthinkable that the Commerce Clause would warrant against such

sober and necessary state regulation.
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